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Introduction
In the summer of 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin went on Israeli television and brushed aside the prospect of negotiations between himself and leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), saying "forget about it" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993). Rabin was reasserting the long-held official position of the Israeli government that, as Rabin himself had once put it, "the PLO is a terrorist organization with whom there is no point in even deluding ourselves into thinking we can negotiate" (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1985) . But meanwhile, thousands of miles to the north in a century-old mansion in a forest in Norway, Israeli officials were secretly meeting with PLO leaders to negotiate the terms of a peace agreement that would come to be known as the Oslo Accords (Fischer 1993) .
Rabin was fully aware of these negotiations when he went on television, yet he continued to condemn the prospect of negotiations with the PLO even as they were being undertaken.
The apparent disconnect between Rabin's rhetoric and his government's behavior is intriguing, particularly since Rabin surely knew that these secret negotiations could not remain secret forever. Whether through chance discovery by the media, or through official announcement of an agreement should negotiations ultimately prove successful, it was clear that the talks in Norway would one day be made known to the world at large and to Israeli voters in particular. Given this, why continue to employ rhetoric that might make the government ultimately appear to have been irresolute or hypocritical?
This example illustrates a kind of strategic decision that has been understudied in the game-theoretic literature on bargaining and negotiations: how publicly to portray an adversary with whom the prospect of negotiations remains open. The historical record exhibits considerable variation in the rhetorical tactics employed by political actors. In some instances, the road to the bargaining table is made smoother by a calming of actors' rhetoric about one another. But in other instances, actors publicly denounce one another as being "beyond the pale" at the very moment that negotiations are secretly getting underway.
What factors give rise to this variation in leaders' behavior? And, ultimately, what effect does pre-negotiation rhetoric have on the conduct of negotiations if they ultimately do take place?
Of course, no one model can aspire comprehensively to answer these questions, given the complexity and diversity of real-world conflict settings. Instead, we aim simply to offer a fresh perspective on these questions, using a novel game-theoretic model of the public rhetoric surrounding private negotiations. Our strategic framework suggests a novel causal mechanism through which actors may be motivated to engage in pre-negotiation rhetoric critical of their adversaries -or to refrain from employing such rhetoric.
In our model, actors decide whether or not to issue public "denunciations" of the idea of negotiating with their counterpart 1 ; subsequently, actors then choose whether or not to enter into a process of secret negotiations with one another. Actors' decisions are not constrained to be publicly consistent, in the sense that (like Rabin) actors are free to denounce a counterpart with whom they nonetheless choose to negotiate.
Given intuitions from existing literature, it is natural to conceptualize such public denunciations as a form of pre-commitment. Specifically, we suppose that an actor's choice of a public "speech," along with her subsequent decision to participate (or not) in negotiations, affects the audience costs that she would experience in her relationship with her own domestic voters. In practice, such audience costs might be generated through any of several distinct mechanisms. Public rhetoric demonizing a counterpart might inflame voters'
1 Because such denunciations commonly take on the form of a claim that the counterpart is in one way or another unfit for diplomacy, we use the language "denounce the idea of negotiations with the counterpart" and "denounce the counterpart" interchangeably.
passions, or transform voters' beliefs about the nature of that counterpart, in either case making negotiations a less palatable prospect for members of the public. Alternatively, any obvious inconsistency between a leader's words and her deeds might erode voter confidence in her honesty or in her steadfastness in pursuing the nation's interests. It is quite natural to suppose that rhetoric of this kind may have a different effect on the audience costs faced by a leader, depending on the ultimate outcome of any negotiations that do take place.
For example, a leader who denounces a counterpart, but negotiates with him anyway, and then fails to achieve an agreement may pay a particularly harsh price for appearing irresolute, incompetent, or both. Consistent with this intuition, a key feature of our audience cost framework is that a decision to denounce one's counterpart makes failed negotiations relatively more costly for an actor.
We model secret negotiations as an open-ended bargaining process, but one which may be stochastically terminated at any stage in the event that the negotiations are prematurely discovered by the media. This feature of our model catalyzes a connection between actors' audience costs and expected bargaining outcomes. As noted above, an actor who has denounced her counterpart before engaging in negotiations has a greater stake in ensuring that these negotiations ultimately end in an agreement rather than in failure. But, an actor who is more fearful of stochastic termination will be less effective at extracting concessions from her counterpart while bargaining is still ongoing. As a result, a denunciation of one's counterpart actually weakens one's own bargaining position.
Given this account, it seems at first glance natural to suppose that leaders would be better off if they were to refrain from denouncing counterparts with whom they actually intend to negotiate -at least in the absence of other motivations that are external to our model.
2 Interestingly, however, this expectation is not always borne out in the equilibria of our model. Instead, we find that actors sometimes do choose to negotiate with counterparts whom they have chosen publicly to denounce.
This result stems from another key component of our framework: the endogeneity of actors' participation (or non-participation) in negotiations. In a setting where bilateral participation in negotiations could be taken as given, a decision to weaken one's own bargaining strength would clearly be counterproductive. However, in our model, actors decide whether or not to participate in negotiations. As an example, consider a setting in which one actor expects that she would gain a great deal from negotiations, compared to her position under the status quo, while a second actor expects that negotiations are not quite worth her while.
In such a setting, the first actor might find highly valuable any mechanism through which she could credibly, but modestly, reduce her own bargaining power. This is the case because reduction in the first actor's bargaining power would increase the second actor's expected returns from taking part in negotiations -thereby potentially offering a pivotal contribution to the second actor's willingness to participate in negotiations at all. This basic logic is borne out in some of the equilibria of our model. Somewhat ironically, in our framework, it is the public denunciation of a counterpart as being an unfit "partner for peace" that can provide the necessary impetus for negotiations to get underway.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places our work in context by briefly describing related literature on bargaining and negotiations. Section 3 then introduces our model; we present and discuss equilibrium analyses derived from the model in Section 4.
Section 5 contains two brief empirical illustrations that highlight the relevance of different facets of our theoretical model to historical cases. Section 6 discusses implications for future research, and concludes.
enemy if such a denunciation were to be politically popular in itself. We abstract away from such alternative motivations in order to lay bare the dynamics of our causal story.
A considerable literature explores the importance of audience costs in international relations. Schelling (1960) offered an early observation that representatives of nations can effectively use public statements as a form of self-commitment in international bargaining, remarking that leaders "seem often to create a bargaining position by public statements, statements calculated to arouse a public opinion that permits no concessions to be made."
This intuition was formalized by Fearon (1994) , who further predicted that the side better able to generate "audience costs" by making public threats would be less likely to back down in an international crisis. In the years since, a number of scholars have theoretically extended and empirically tested models of audience costs (Partell and Palmer 1999 , Schultz 2001 , Tomz 2007 . Smith (1998) Of particular relevance to our work is Leventoglu & Tarar (2005) , in which players can make costly public commitments before engaging in negotiations as a means of extracting concessions from their opponent. In their model, making a public commitment is a dominant strategy for both sides, even though both sides would be better off if they could commit not to make such public statements. Leventoglu and Tarar suggest that secret negotiations are the solution to this prisoner's dilemma.
Our work differs in a number of respects from existing models of pre-commitment and audience costs, including Leventoglu and Tarar. One key difference in our framework is that when actors make "commitments," they are effectively announcing an intention not to negotiate at all ; most of the existing literature focuses on commitments by leaders to bring home certain specific concessions from negotiations that are certain to take place.
Indeed, in our model, actors' public commitments reduce rather than increase their own bargaining power, behavior that can be rationalized in our framework because negotiations are endogenously entered into as well as secret.
Substantively, a potentially fruitful area of application for our ideas is the study of terrorism and counterterrorism policy. A variety of authors have explored actors' commitments never to negotiate with actors they publicly label as "terrorists. " Sandler, Tschirhart & Cauley (1983) show that "no-negotiation" policies are suboptimal unless terrorist groups are risk-seeking, while Lapan & Sandler (1988) argue that governments should not commit to no-negotiation strategies "except in a limited number of contrived cases" due to time inconsistency concerns. Clutterbuck (1993) advises that governments should "never say never" because certain scenarios necessitate concessions and it is best for a government to be open to negotiations. Tucker (1998) argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, governments that negotiate with terrorists and make concessions to them may not experience an increased level of terrorist violence. Sederberg (1995) argues that a regime's decision to negotiate with a terrorist group (or not) should depend upon certain structural factors, such as the size of the terrorists' base of support and the nature of the terrorists' goals. He also emphasizes that a regime must consider not only the direct costs of concessions, but also the political costs that may accrue to an actor who has been publicly observed to make concessions.
A Model of Secret Negotiations
We model an interaction between two actors, A and B. If play advances to the secret negotiations stage, then both actors A and B engage in a bargaining process that may (or may not) extend over a number of different bargaining rounds, depending on the path of play. At the beginning of each bargaining round that takes place, the role of "proposer" is randomly allocated; specifically, at the beginning of any given bargaining round, A is drawn as the proposer with probability q, while B is drawn as the proposer with complementary probability 1 − q. As such, q serves as a proxy for certain structural factors that may advantage one side relative to the other in the conduct of negotiations. The draw of a proposer at the beginning of any given bargaining round is independent of the draws in all previous rounds. An actor in the role of proposer must choose either to propose a division of a fixed sum of size π, or else to "pass" up her turn as proposer. If proposer i chooses to make a proposal in bargaining round t, we denote this proposal as x i,t , where x i,t represents the share reserved for the proposer (i). A proposal x i,t implicitly offers an amount π − x i,t to the proposer's counterpart. A decision to "pass" corresponds to a failure to offer a proposal.
If a proposal is made in a given bargaining round, the proposer's counterpart must choose either to accept or to reject the division of π described by the proposal. If the proposal is accepted, then the secret negotiations stage and the game as a whole both come to an end, and the division described by the proposal is carried out. If, instead, the proposal is rejected -or if the proposer chose to "pass" -then the bargaining round comes to an end; subsequently, one of two things may happen. First, with probability p, the process of secret negotiations is discovered and made public by the media. We assume, in the aftermath of such an unexpected public revelation, that the bargaining process terminates and that the game ends without a negotiated settlement being reached. We refer to such an outcome as an exogenous termination. Second, with probability 1 − p, the process of secret negotiations is not discovered by the media, and the secret negotiations stage continues to a new bargaining round.
Finally, we specify actors' payoffs for the different potential outcomes of the game as a whole. Actors' payoffs are determined by two distinct factors.
First, actors' payoffs are affected by the ultimate state of relations between one another.
If actors reach a negotiated settlement -that is, if a proposal is accepted during the secret negotiations stage -then actors receive utility corresponding to their bargaining share. We assume throughout that actors are risk neutral, and take a proposer i's utility from an accepted proposal simply to be x i (and the counterpart's utility to be π − x i ). If actors do not reach a negotiated settlement -that is, if secret negotiations were never initiated, or if such negotiations were terminated before an agreement was reached -then actors instead receive utility reflecting their status quo positions, in the form of the relevant value of SQ i .
As such, the relative attractiveness of engaging in negotiations -and of particular proposals that may be offered -depend both on actors' valuations of the status quo situation as well as on the value π that is available to be divided in successful negotiations.
Second, actors' payoffs are also affected by the ultimate public response to any secret negotiations which have taken place, once these negotiations have been publicly revealed.
We model this component of an actor's payoffs in terms of a political "cost" for engaging in secret negotiations that varies across two dimensions: whether or not the negotiations ultimately proved successful, and whether or not the actor had previously denounced the idea of negotiating with her counterpart. The notation we employ in representing this cost reflects both of these features; the cost to actor i ∈ {A, B} for engaging in secret negotiations takes on one of the four values c is higher when those negotiations fail than when they succeed. In addition, it requires that the higher cost associated with failed negotiations is relatively worse for an actor who has denounced her counterpart than for an actor who has not.
Intuitively, some members of an actor's public may construe that actor's act of denouncement as a binding policy promise. If those members of the public then subsequently learn that the government had, contrary to the face value of the denouncement, engaged in secret negotiations with the adversary, this might affect the government's perceived credibility through raising doubts about its honesty or about its steadfastness in implementing policy.
However, it is reasonable to suppose that such an effect on public opinion would be relatively worse for failed than for successful secret negotiations. When secret negotiations are successful, members of the public may be willing to interpret a leader's decision to negotiate despite a denouncement in a more favorable light; the leader may have perceived an unforeseen opportunity, or learned something about the adversary that was contrary to the original grounds for the denouncement. The successful completion of secret negotiations may also signal competence on the leader's part. In contrast, when secret negotiations fail, the leader runs the risk of looking incompetent and disingenuous simultaneously. These intuitions suggest that any political costs of negotiating in spite of a denouncement would be heightened when the negotiations fail to achieve a settlement to the ongoing conflict.
As noted above, actors' utilities are independent of their first-stage "speech" choices if no process of secret negotiations takes place; the political "cost" of non-engagement in secret negotiations is effectively normalized to 0. We employ notation of the form c 
Theoretical Results
In this section, we derive a series of theoretical results. Throughout, our solution concept is subgame-perfect equilibrium in sequentially weakly-undominated strategies.
The Secret Negotiations Stage
In order to build intuition, we begin by separately analyzing behavior in all subgames corresponding to the secret negotiations stage. This initial analysis, which takes actors' speech choices s A and s B to be exogenous and fixed, demonstrates how secret negotiations would proceed if actors were to opt in to negotiations, given particular values of s A and s B . Discussion of actors' behavior in earlier stages -their speech choices, and their decisions regarding coming to the negotiating table -is reserved for Section 4.2.
The following Proposition characterizes equilibrium behavior under secret negotiations.
Unsurprisingly, the nature of equilibrium behavior varies along with the parameters of the model. The statement of the Proposition in the main text refers to four "regions" -(0),
(1), (2a), and (2b) -across which equilibrium behavior differs. These regions, formally defined in the Appendix, are illustrated in Figure 1 and described in the text that follows the Proposition. 
Proof. The proof and further details of actors' equilibrium strategies are contained in the appendix.
Figure 1 offers a graphical depiction of the regions referred to in the Proposition. In Region (0), neither actor is willing to make an offer that is acceptable to the other; as a result, secret negotiations continue until they end, in failure, with public discovery. As This variation in equilibrium behavior across regions is consonant with the first of several noteworthy comparative statics associated with Proposition 1: an actor i's share from bargaining is (weakly) increasing in her own status quo payoff SQ i and (weakly) decreasing in her counterpart's status quo payoff. Intuitively, consider the incentives of actors in the first bargaining round of secret negotiations. If secret negotiations do not succeed in this first round, it is possible that the media will discover them before a second round takes place, causing these negotiations exogenously to terminate in failure. Recall that, if negotiations fail, relations between actors revert to the status quo. This implies that the prospect of exogenous termination is less worrisome for an actor, the better her position under the status quo. As a result, in equilibrium, an actor can effectively demand more, and will be offered more by her counterpart, the higher her valuation of the status quo. Conversely, an actor can effectively demand more, and can expect to be offered more by her counterpart in equilibrium, the lower her counterpart's valuation of the status quo. Another important comparative static reflects the influence of actors' potential audience costs on the bargaining outcomes they can expect to achieve in equilibrium. From the perspective of an actor i who has already entered into secret negotiations, the relevant quantity is c -that is, the extent to which she would be further politically disadvantaged by experiencing failed (rather than successful) negotiations. In addition, an actor's share from bargaining is (weakly) increasing in her counterpart's value of c F − c S -that is, the extent to which her counterpart would pay an additional audience cost if negotiations were to fail. The intuition behind these findings is also straightforward.
In the model, once secret negotiations have begun, they are always revealed eventually. The only question is whether they are revealed at a point in time when a successful outcome is publicly disclosed, or by the media while negotiations are still ongoing, leading to exogenous termination. Given this, it is clear that an actor whose own value of c F − c S is larger would find the exogenous termination of negotiations to be more troublesome. As a result, this actor's bargaining strength would be reduced; her counterpart, knowing that actor's costs for failed negotiations, could get away with demanding more and succeed in offering less.
This section has considered the secret negotiations stage in isolation. However, this last comparative static will have especially important implications for actors' choices of a speech, s i ∈ {d, dd}, in the game as a whole. Recall that in our model c
either actor i ∈ {A, B}. That is, a decision to denounce one's counterpart increases one's relative cost for failed negotiations, thereby decreasing one's own bargaining strength.
In the next section, we analyze equilibrium behavior in the game as a whole, addressing the question of why actors might sometimes find it in their interests intentionally to weaken their own bargaining power by denouncing a potential negotiating "partner."
The Game as a Whole
In the game as a whole, of course, actors choose endogenously whether or not to take part in secret negotiations. Each actor's decision must involve a comparison between the value of the actor's status quo position on the one hand, and the actor's expected utility from entering secret negotiations on the other hand. In evaluating the latter, both the actor's expected Proof. The proof is contained in the appendix.
The Proposition establishes that secret negotiations may or may not take place, and that zero, one or both of the two actors may choose to denounce one another in equilibrium. We offer some intuition about the logic underlying each kind of equilibrium, and the conditions under which these different equilibria exist. First, consider equilibrium (I), in which both A and B refrain from denouncing one another. As noted in the Proposition, the relevant conditions require that both SQ A and SQ B be sufficiently low relative to the benefits available from bargaining when s A = s B = dd.
Correspondingly, equilibrium (I) appears in the lower left portion of each panel in Figure 3 .
Sufficiently low values of both SQ A and SQ B imply that both A and B are comparatively unsatisfied with the status quo, relative to the shares of the bargaining sum π that each could feasibly expect to obtain during negotiations. As a result, both actors are quite motivated to engage one another in secret negotiations. In such a setting, denouncing one's counterpart can only be counterproductive; given that negotiations are going to take place, such a denunciation only serves to weaken one's own bargaining position and increase one's own audience costs. As such, neither actor denounces the other in the context of this equilibrium.
The dynamics of equilibria (II) and (III) are quite different. In both cases, one of the two actors has a sufficiently low valuation of the status quo relative to the benefits available from bargaining that she would prefer to take part in secret negotiations even under the most unfavorable rhetorical circumstances: those in which she has weakened her own bargaining position by unilaterally denouncing her counterpart while that counterpart chose not to denounce her in return. However, in both cases, the second actor has a higher valuation of the status quo relative to the benefits available from bargaining. This higher valuation leads the second actor only to prefer entering negotiations under more favorable rhetorical circumstances. As a result, the second actor can be enticed to the negotiating table only if the first actor has credibly weakened her own bargaining position in advance. In equilibria (II) and (III), the first actor does so by denouncing the idea of negotiations with her counterpart, even as the second actor remains silent. This configuration of behavior strengthens the second actor's bargaining position sufficiently that she becomes willing to negotiate, thereby leaving both actors better off. This poses a stark contrast to the logic described above that underlies equilibrium (I). Here, the first actor benefits from weakening her own bargaining power, because in so doing she makes a pivotal contribution to the second actor's willingness to negotiate at all. In equilibrium (I), in contrast, negotiations were a foregone conclusion, and weakening one's own bargaining power would carry no such benefit.
The four panels of Figure The dynamics of equilibrium (IV), in which both A and B denounce one another, are yet In Figure 3 , equilibrium (IV) appears only in the first panel. Intuitively, the conditions for this equilibrium require both actors to have intermediate valuations of the status quo relative to expected bargaining gains. As such, factors that lead to significant imbalances in bargaining power -for example, an increase in q beyond a certain threshold -will tend to make the conditions impossible to fulfill, as one actor's expected bargaining gains significantly rise while the other's significantly falls. We note that, in panel (a), equilibrium (I) also exists over the full domain of equilibrium (IV)'s existence. However, under other conditions not pictured here, equilibrium (IV) can be the unique equilibrium of the game.
Finally, the last part of the Proposition notes that equilibria also exist in which secret negotiations do not take place. Such equilibria exist when SQ A and SQ B are sufficiently high, as is depicted in all four panels of Figure 3 . Equilibria of this form could arise for a number of different reasons. In some settings, they may exist because one (or both) of the actors never could be induced to engage in negotiations, because her valuation of the status quo is sufficiently high relative to the bargaining outcomes that she feasibly could achieve. In other settings, they may exist because each of the actors is willing to engage in negotiations only under specific circumstances -that is, given specific histories from the first stage -and the fulfillment of each actor's "conditions" precludes the fulfillment of the other's. 
Empirical Illustrations
In this section, we present two brief historical illustrations that highlight the empirical relevance of different facets of our theoretical model. Of course, no abstract and relatively simple model can reflect every nuance of complicated historical cases. Rather, our objective here is very briefly to illustrate the existence of audience costs associated with participation in secret negotiations, as well as the idea that such audience costs can facilitate successful outcomes to negotiations.
The Oslo Accords
As we alluded to in the introduction, negotiating with the PLO was "one of Israel's most rigid political taboos." (Hedges 1993 But this political price is seen as having been necessary for successful negotiations to occur;
by maintaining a high cost for engaging in negotiations, the Israeli government was able to lure the PLO leadership to the bargaining table (Yudelman 1993 Israel put enormous pressure on the Israeli government to ensure that the negotiations were successful. The resulting talks did produce an agreement, the Camp David Accords, which have sustained peace (albeit a "cold peace") between the two countries for decades (Schmidt 1991 Using a novel game-theoretic model of conflict bargaining, this paper has offered a fresh perspective on these questions. In the equilibria of our model, we find that actors may or may not choose to denounce one another in advance of secret negotiations. In our framework, rhetoric of this kind affects actors' audience costs, and through this, the specific outcomes actors could expect to achieve during secret negotiations. An actor who makes a public commitment not to negotiate with a counterpart it considers to be beneath diplomacy, but who then subsequently does so, is especially motivated to ensure that negotiations do not fail.
This motivation, naturally, reduces her own bargaining power. Yet, under certain conditions that we describe, an actor finds it in her own best interests to reduce her own bargaining power in this way, if in so doing she makes a pivotal contribution to her counterpart's willingness to negotiate at all. In this way, somewhat ironically, harsh pu blic rhetoric can help smooth the way to successful settlements during secret negotiations.
Of course, we do not claim that this specific mechanism underlies all public commitments not to negotiate with a counterpart. Instead, we explicate the game-theoretic logic behind one novel mechanism that may be relevant to some empirical cases. From a broader perspective, our work extends the game-theoretic literature on audience costs and negotiations by describing the logic of a setting in which actors freely choose to weaken their own bargaining position in equilibrium. More generally still, our framework offers a fresh perspective on the potential connections between political rhetoric and political outcomes in settings of conflict.
We are hopeful that extensions of our work may allow us to explore further the strategic logic of labeling one's enemies in a variety of conflict contexts, particularly in the context of counterterrorism policy. Under what circumstances do actors choose to label counterparts as "terrorist" organizations -and under what circumstances do they refrain from doing so? As a prescriptive matter, when are actors' strategic interests actually best served by employing such labels? The answers to these questions, and many others, must await further research.
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Region ( accepting the offer; a one-shot deviation to rejection of the offer instead yields continuation
from a one-shot deviation to rejection. Clearly in an equilibrium of this form, the first quantity must be at least as great as the second for each of these two actors. We next consider the incentives of A and B to make the offers x * A and x * B , respectively. We note first that, if A is willing to make an acceptable offer in equilibrium, it must satisfy π − x *
; an offer involving any smaller value x * A would be a dominated action for A.
, is obtained by considering B's incentives to make the offer x * B . These conditions form a system of simultaneous equations, the unique solutions to which are x * 
. She therefore has no incentive to make such a one-shot deviation so long as
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. A has no incentive to make such a one-shot deviation so long as the first quantity is at least as great as the second, a condition which can be rewritten as
. At the same time, B receives utility −c S B from accepting the offer x * A = π; a one-shot deviation to rejecting this offer yields utility
. B has no incentive to make such a deviation so long
We next consider the incentives of A and B to make the offers x * A and x * B , respectively.
We note first that, if B is willing to make an acceptable offer in equilibrium, it must satisfy (1) and (2a) [ (1) and (2b) 
With these notes in mind, collection of the case-by-case results below implies the conditions given in the Proposition. As is clear from the logic below, the region where equilibria exist in which secret negotiations do not take place can be more formally specified as the union of the last six regions considered. Below, the notation dd i d is used to indicate, for example, that i receives higher expected utility from dd than from d under the specified circumstances; the notation N i NN is used to indicate that i receives higher expected utility from negotiations taking place (N) than from negotiations not taking place (NN) under the specified circumstances. The symbols i and ∼ i have the obvious parallel meanings. (dd, d) . Thus, all equilibrium play must involve (n, n) and (dd, dd).
). An identical argument, with actor labels permuted, leads to the same conclusion. 
Thus, all equilibrium play must involve (n, n) and (dd, dd).
An identical argument, with actor labels permuted, leads to the same conclusion. 
As such, play of dd will be sequentially strictly dominated by play of d for B.
Thus, all equilibrium play must involve (n, n)
with actor labels permuted, leads to the conclusion that all equilibrium play must involve (n, n) and (d, dd) . 
). An identical argument, with actor labels permuted, leads to the conclusion that all equilibrium play must involve (d, dd) and (n, n). otherwise, no negotiations take place. In the first stage, then,
Given these mutual best responses, all equilibrium play must involve (n, n) and either (dd, dd) (d, d) ). An identical argument, with actor labels permuted, leads to the same conclusion. 
